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Abstract. The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC)
is a yearly-organized international contest in which participants from all
over the world develop intelligent negotiating agents for a variety of nego-
tiation problems. To facilitate the research on agent-based negotiation,
the organizers introduce new research challenges every year. ANAC 2019
posed five negotiation challenges: automated negotiation with partial
preferences, repeated human-agent negotiation, negotiation in supply-
chain management, negotiating in the strategic game of Diplomacy, and
in the Werewolf game. This paper introduces the challenges and discusses
the main findings and lessons learnt per league.
1 Introduction
Negotiation has become a well-established research field within the area of Arti-
ficial Intelligence and multi-agent systems. The research has focused on for-
malization of negotiation process (i.e., domain and preference representation,
and protocols) and the design of intelligent negotiating agents (i.e., bidding
strategies, opponent models, and acceptance strategies) in order to automate
this complex process. Automated negotiation dates back to the 1980’s when e-
commerce took flight, see e.g., [29,37]. The field was formalized in the 1990’s
(see e.g., [34,36,38]). Over the years negotiating agents have been developed
for automated negotiation, human-agent negotiation, and negotiation support.
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In automated negotiation all negotiation parties are automated agents, while
in human-agent negotiation, some of them are human [31]. Negotiation support
agents form a team with one or more humans to play together as one negoti-
ation party in any kind of negotiation (automated, human-human, or human-
agent) [18].
With the growing number of proposed negotiation agents, the need for com-
parison and rigorous evaluation of the quality of the negotiating agents increases
as well. This led to formal evaluation metrics [12,14,21,23], the open-source
negotiation platform GENIUS to enable benchmarking [20], and in 2010 it ini-
tiated the annual ANAC (Automated Negotiation Agents Competition) [5].
The competition turned into a mechanism for the field to organize itself as the
researchers use the yearly meetings to jointly set the research agenda. Over the
years, the negotiation problems studied in the context of ANAC [3] span bilateral
[5], non-linear [2], multilateral [11], and repeated [1] negotiations. As an added
advantage, by now GENIUS holds a host of agents, negotiation domains and
preference profiles.
Since 2017, ANAC has added two new leagues: a Human-Agent league and a
league for the game Diplomacy. In the Human-Agent league, which is based on
the IAGO framework [24], agents exchange partial offers, preferential information
and through emoji’s some emotional information with their human opponents,
see e.g., [26]. In the game Diplomacy the agents have to negotiate on the basis of
heuristics, as there is no explicit utility function available [15]. In 2019, two more
leagues were added: the Supply Chain Management league (SCM) [28] and the
Werewolf League [30]. The SCM league allows researchers to study negotiation
and partner selection in a recurring setting of trade. In the Werewolf game the
essence of negotiation studied is that agents need to assess the utility functions
of the other players and convince others to play a successful voting strategy.
The challenges for the ANAC 2019 competition were as follows (organised per
league):
– Automated Negotiation Main League: preference uncertainty.
Human negotiators do not necessarily know their own utility function explic-
itly, and there are practical limits on the preference elicitation process. There-
fore, the challenge is to design an agent that can do bilateral negotiations
receiving only partial qualitative preference information.
– Human-Agent League: building cooperation. The challenge is to estab-
lish a cooperative relationship with the human participant in repeated nego-
tiations with the same human opponent. Successful agent strategies capture
human behavior. While an aggressive strategy in the first negotiation may
prove effective, it could have such a backfire effect by the last negotiation
that it is not the right choice overall.
– Diplomacy: beat the basic agent. Like last year, the challenge was to beat
the standard agent provided by the BANDANA framework. No participating
agent managed this in 2018.
– Supply Chain Management: recurrent chain negotiations. The chal-
lenges are to decide on their own utility function, when and with whom to
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negotiate and how to negotiate in a supply chain in order to maximize their
overall profit.
– The Werewolf game. The challenge for the agents is to estimate possible
allies and deceivers (estimated utility), to communicate strategy and infor-
mation to other agents, and to negotiate a voting pattern that is beneficial
to one’s own team.
This paper consists of sections for each league in which the challenges and
main competition results are discussed. The last section presents some of the
upcoming challenges.
2 Automated Negotiation Main League
There are still many open challenges for automated negotiation [6,7], such as
strategy learning, opponent recognition, domain learning, preference elicitation
and reasoning. The Automated Negotiation league in 2019, informally known as
the GENIUS league, focused on negotiating agents that receive partial prefer-
ence information. This challenge is part of the larger research problem of domain
learning and preference elicitation. The motivating idea is that when a negoti-
ating agent represents a user in a negotiation, it cannot know exactly what the
user wants due to practical limits on the preference elicitation process [4].
For ANAC 2019, the preferences of the agent were given in the form of a
ranking of a limited number of possible agreements ωi; i.e. ω1 ≤ · · · ≤ ωd. The
rankings were generated randomly from existing negotiation scenarios in which
full utility information was available from a standard additive utility function
u. Intuitively, the number of rankings d that the agent receives is inversely cor-
related to the preference uncertainty of the agent. The agent has to negotiate
based on these ordinal preference information, and if it manages to reach a cer-
tain outcome ω∗, then the score the agent receives for this agreement is based
on the original utility function, i.e., u(ω∗). An overview of this procedure is
presented in Fig. 1. In short, the agent receives ordinal information only, but is
evaluated based on the underlying cardinal ground-truth.
Table 1 shows the average individual utility and the average product of util-
ities gained by all participants in a tournament in which each agent negotiated
with all other agents five times for each negotiation scenario. When evaluating
on individual utility, AgentGG won the competition with an average of 0.76, the
agents KakeSoba and SAGA were awarded second and third place. When evalu-
ating on fairness (i.e. the product of the utilities of the negotiated agreements),
winkyAgent won the competition with an average utility of 0.56, and agents
FSEGA2019 and AgentGP were awarded second and third place respectively.
As intended, the key to win this league is for agents to predict both their
own and their opponent’s utility accurately from uncertain information. The
top agents were able to obtain high individual utilities even under high prefer-
ence certainty, using a variety of preference estimation techniques. In estimating
the preferences, the top ranking agents used techniques such as batch gradient
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Fig. 1. Uncertainty challenge in ANAC 2019
descent (e.g. winkyAgent), genetic algorithms using spearman’s rank correlation
(e.g. SAGA), and statistical frequency modelling (e.g. AgentGG).
The performance of the top ranking agents suggests that it is possible to
reconstruct enough of the true utility function based on partial information
about the ranking of a number of bids. The next question is of course, how
much partial information is required. Therefore, the ANAC community decided
to formulate the next challenge, which incentivizes agent designers to use as
little information as possible to still get good performance: next year, the agents
initially will receive very sparse preference data, and will be allowed to ask for
more preference information against an elicitation cost.
3 Human-Agent League
The human-agent league focuses on the myriad social effects present in mixed
human-agent interactions. Indeed, understanding how humans negotiate has
been a key question in business and psychological literature for many years—it is
a complex social task [19,25,32,33]. But as automated agents are used more fre-
quently in real-life applications (e.g., chatbots), we should design agents that are
capable of interacting with humans in social settings. As human-agent negotia-
tion is fundamentally different from agent-agent negotiation, the Human-Agent
League (HAL) was added in 2017 to promote research into this promising area.
HAL utilizes the IAGO Negotiation platform, which was proposed and
designed by Mell et al. [24]. IAGO provides a front-facing GUI for the human
participants. This feature allows subjects to be recruited using online platforms,
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such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Additionally, IAGO provides the
features necessary for simulating the characteristics of human negotiation. These
include an expanded set of channels for communication between both sides of
negotiation, such as by sending text, expressing preferences, and transmitting
emotions. Text is transmitted through a set of pre-selected utterances, and emo-
tions are transmitted by selecting from a variety of prototypical “emojis” within
the interface. Furthermore, IAGO allows “partial offers” (i.e., offers not contain-
ing values for all negotiation issues) and implements a flexible, human-inspired
protocol: few enforcement mechanisms for incomplete deals, and no explicit turn-
taking.
These features of IAGO mean that it provides a platform to address the basic
features that intelligent agents require to negotiate with humans. It provides
information that allows for human-opponent modeling, and for agents to pursue
more complex strategies that require specific features (such as partial offers),
and the information from the multiple channels for communication.
Results from the first and second human-agent leagues (see [25,26]) show
that while certain strategies may be effective in the short term, there is a trade-
off between agent likeability and agent success. To further examine this, the
structure of the repeated negotiations were changed.
In this year’s competition, three back-to-back negotiations were conducted.
Similar to previous competitions, the negotiation involved a 4-issue bargaining
task. Each issue could take from 4 to 8 items, e.g., offering 4 to 8 bananas.
Each of the three negotiations took up to 7 min, and a BATNA was available
for those who could not reach an agreement. Each agent negotiated against at
least 25 human participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk subject pool, and
those participants were subject to attention checks and filtering. All participants
were US-residing, and English-speaking. Per standard practice, incentives were
scaled with performance, so participants were encouraged to do well. Data was
collected on demographics, performance metrics, and subject-reported likeability
measures of the agent. All procedures were approved by University of Southern
California’s Institutional Review Board, including the informed consent process.
In contrast to previous years, the negotiations were not identical in structure.
Instead, while there were integrative opportunities to “grow the pie” within each
negotiation, there was a larger, cross-negotiation possibility to find integrative
potential between negotiations #1 and #3. This higher performance opportunity
is reflected in negotiation #3, where agents generally have more points due to
structural differences.
Regardless of this effect, we did find a variety of performance differences
across the submitted agents. In particular, we had two standout agents in terms
of performance: agents Dona and Draft (See Fig. 2). The Draft Agent was sub-
mitted by Bohan Xu, Shadow Pritchard, James Hale, & Sandip Sen from the
University of Tulsa, while the Dona Agent was submitted by Eden Shalom Erez,
Inon Zuckerman, and Galit Haim of Ariel University and The College of Manage-
ment Academic Studies. These agents took unique approaches to the challenges
of negotiation by making agents be guided by the “meta-rules” of negotiation.
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Table 1. Results of automated negotiation league
Individual utility Nash product
Agent  Mean  Mean
AgentGG 1 0.7574 5 0.5398
AgentGP 10 0.6948 3 0.546
AgentLarry 15 0.5984 11 0.5082
AgentPeraltaV2 18 0.5528 17 0.4012
AuthenticAgent 20 0.3882 20 0.1947
dandikAgent 9 0.6995 13 0.4628
EAgent 14 0.6553 16 0.4286
FSEGA2019 8 0.7002 2 0.5495
GaravelAgent 13 0.6571 15 0.4365
Gravity 17 0.5782 18 0.361
Group1 BOA 11 0.6927 6 0.5392
HardDealer 5 0.7245 9 0.5172
IBasic 21 0.32 21 0.136
KAgent 16 0.5943 14 0.4569
KakeSoba 2 0.7433 7 0.5259
MINF 4 0.728 10 0.5133
SACRA 19 0.4901 19 0.3166
SAGA 3 0.7315 4 0.5423
SolverAgent 6 0.7126 8 0.5257
TheNewDeal 12 0.6863 12 0.4873
winkyAgent 7 0.7093 1 0.5625
Dona agent customized the interface to instruct the user to answer questions
using the emoji buttons. Draft agent enforced strict protocols for the humans
to follow; it required human participants to describe their preferences in a set
order. The success of these agents speaks to the importance of setting a clear
protocol in negotiations that cannot be manipulated by the agents. Furthermore,
we learned that humans are inclined to adhere to changes in protocol made by
their automated counterparts.
For the next Human-Agent competition, we have decided to adapt the task
beyond the 2019 competition. Firstly, while the novelty of the agents that mod-
ified the interface led to some unexpected yet interesting results, we will be
returning to a competition in which the interface protocols are set at the begin-
ning of the interaction. The lessons learned from this competition have led to
new insights in UI design which have been integrated into the IAGO platform.
Secondly, we will be allowing the human users to set their own preferences in the
negotiation. This is both more realistic to the real world, and will also ensure
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that the agent designers have to contend with a set of potential negotiation struc-
tures. We hope that this next competition will continue to push the envelope in
designing more realistic and useful social agents.
Fig. 2. Total agent score (summed over all negotiations)
4 The Diplomacy League
Diplomacy [9] is a deterministic board game for seven players, with no hidden
information. It is designed such that players need to form coalitions and nego-
tiate with each other. The interesting aspect of Diplomacy as a test case for
Automated Negotiations is that there is no explicit formula to calculate utility
values. Just as in games like Chess or Go, it is simply too complex to calculate
such values exactly, so agents have to apply heuristics to estimate the values
of their deals. Although Diplomacy has been under attention of the Automated
Negotiations community for a long time [8,10,17,22,35], to date few successful
negotiating Diplomacy players have been developed.
In the previous two editions of the ANAC Diplomacy League ANAC [15]
none of the submitted agents was able to beat the challenge and outperform even
a non-negotiating agent. Therefore, we decided to make the challenge slightly
easier by making sure that negotiating agents were always assigned to ‘Powers’
that are known to work well together [15]. Other than this, the setup of the 2019
competition was kept practically identical to the previous years.
Participants had to implement a negotiation algorithm on top of the existing
D-Brane agent [17], which by itself does not negotiate. Negotiations took place
under the Unstructured Negotiation Protocol [16]. The competition consisted of
two rounds. In Round 1, each agent only played against three copies of itself
and three non-negotiating instances of D-Brane, while in Round 2, all submitted
agents played against each other. In order to beat the challenge, an agent had to
satisfy two criteria: it would have to outperform the non-negotiating D-Branes
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in Round 1, as well as beat all opponents in Round 2. In case no agent was able
to beat the challenge (as in previous years) the Backup Rule would come into
effect, which states that the agent that made the most proposals in Round 2
that were eventually accepted by other agents would be declared the winner.
The competition received five submissions. Unfortunately, none of them was
able to outperform D-Brane in Round 1 (Table 2). This suggests that the agents
were not cooperative enough to be able to strike a good deal even when their
opponents are identical to themselves. On the plus side, in Round 2 we did
see that for the first time in the history of the ANAC Diplomacy league one
agent, namely Oslo A, by Liora Zaidner et al., was able to clearly outperform
all other agents (Table 3). However, according to the rules of the competition it
was Saitama, by Ryohei Kawata that was declared to be the winner, by virtue
of the Backup Rule (Table 4).








Table 3. Results of round 2. Oslo A outperforms all other agents, and is the only one
that outperforms the non-negotiating D-Brane. Biu3141 could not participate in this
round because it was too slow. GamlBot and M@stermind are submissions from previous
years that were added to complete the field.
Agent Score
1 Oslo A 6.68 ± 0.31
D-Brane 5.56 ± 0.27
2 DipBrain 5.06 ± 0.24
3 Saitama 4.88 ± 0.23
GamlBot 4.79 ± 0.21
4 BackstabAgent 4.20 ± 0.25
M@sterMind 2.83 ± 0.17
Analyzing the source code of Oslo A we noticed that its bidding strategy was
surprisingly simple. At the beginning of each round it simply asks the underlying
D-Brane module which moves it would make if no agreements are made. Then, for
each of these moves, it asks the other players to support those moves. The authors
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Table 4. Results according to the Backup Rule. This table displays the number of
proposals proposed by each agent in Round 2 that were eventually accepted by the




3 Oslo A 4393
4 DipBrain 4373
also intended their agent to react to incoming proposals by either accepting them
or making counter proposals, but due to bugs in the code, these components did
not work. This also explains why Oslo A failed in Round 1: if all players are
copies of Oslo A then no proposal is ever accepted, so no deals are made at all.
From this competition (as well as its predecessors in 2017 and 2018) we
learn that it is still very hard to implement successful negotiation algorithms for
domains as complex as Diplomacy. So far, no submission has been able to beat
the challenge. Specifically, we make the following observations:
1. Most agents never make any proposals for any of the future turns. They only
make proposals for the current turn.
2. Many agents do not outperform the non-negotiating D-Brane, or even score
worse. This means that the deals they make often have a detrimental effect.
3. Many of the agents seem to have bugs in their code.
Regarding the first point, we remark that in Diplomacy it is essential to plan
several steps ahead, because it does not often occur that two players can both
directly benefit from cooperation. Players should therefore be willing to help
another player while only expecting the favor to be returned at a later stage.
However, most submissions do not seem to exhibit this behavior. The second
point might explain the success of Oslo A. After all, this agent only asked the
other agents to support the orders that it was already going to make anyway.
Therefore, its agreements can never have any detrimental effect. Furthermore,
these observations suggest that Diplomacy is so complex that it requires a long
time to design sophisticated agents for the game. This may explain that within
the design time given in the ANAC competition, none of the participating teams
managed to develop an agent that can beat D-Brane.
5 The Werewolf League
Werewolf, also known as Mafia, is a communication game where an uninformed
majority team (the village) plays against an informed minority team (the were-
wolves). The goal of the game is to eliminate all players from the opposing team
through a voting process: at each turn, the players must agree on one player to
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eliminate. This takes the shape of a discussion, followed by a vote, and a simple
majority eliminates one player from the game.
From an Automated Negotiation point of view, the challenge for an agent
in Werewolf is to successfully engage in coalition-building. In other words, the
agent must identify other players in the game that share the same utility values
as itself, at the same time that it must avoid deceitful agents. This requires
the agent to communicate its own utility to the other agents, and engage in
discussion to obtain the necessary information.
In the past six years, the AIWolf Project has proposed the Werewolf game
as a benchmark for AI research [39] and organized four national competitions
on the game. Compared to other AI benchmark games such as Go, Starcraft or
Poker, Werewolf is unique in that the communication between agents is the key
skill that must be mastered to obtain high levels of play. A successful Werewolf
agent must be able to build a model of the other players’ beliefs, identify allied
players, and exchange this information through communication [13].
The 2019 Automated Negotiating Agents Competition was the first time that
the AIWolf Project competition was held for an international audience. The
participants were tasked to implement an agent capable of playing the Werewolf
game against other automated players. The interaction of the agents is governed
by a communication protocol1. This protocol uses a formal grammar, a fixed set
of keywords, basic logic and causal expressions [30]. The keywords enable the
players to express intent, beliefs about the game state, requests for information,
and requests for action. For example, to express the following sentence:
“I vote for agent 3 because agent 3 did not vote for agent 4, and agent 4 was a
werewolf”,
An agent would have to use the following protocol sentence:
BECAUSE (AND (NOT <agent3> VOTE <agent4>)
(COMINGOUT <agent4> <werewolf>))
(VOTE <agent3>)
The competition happens in two stages. In the preliminary stage, all agents
play in a large number of trials. Each trial is composed of one hundred 15-player
games, where the players are chosen randomly from the competition pool, and
the roles are also distributed randomly. These trials are repeated until all agents
have played a minimum number of games. The agents are ranked by their victory
rate, and the 15 highest agents advance to the next stage. In the finalist stage,
the participating design teams are allowed to modify their agents and submit
source code and a description document. Then, the agents play several games
against each other in 15-player games. The agent with the highest victory rate
is declared the winner of the competition.
A total of 94 people registered to the competition, and 74 submitted agents.
Out of those agents, 43 were disqualified due to bugs. Many of these disqualified
competitors submitted a single version of their agents, which indicates that they
did not review their agent based on the feedback from the testing server. Among
the 15 finalists, 8 submitted agents in Java, 6 in Python, and 1 in C-Sharp. The
1 AIWolf Protocol Version 3.6.
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winning agent, “Takeda”, had a 0.6 overall win rate, and a 0.68 villager win rate.
Two of the finalists had to be disqualified due to bugs in their code.
Most of the finalist agents were forks of the agents that won the 4th Japanese
AIWolf competition. Here we highlight the “Fisherman” agent, which used three
different winners from the previous competition as basis, and chose which winner
to play based on a multi-armed bandit strategy. Five agents, including the grand
winner “Takeda”, used some form of machine learning to estimate the team
allegiance of the other players. The other nine agents used hand-crafted scripts
to define the actions of the agents. Among these hand crafted rules, we highlight
trying to remove agents with the highest or lowest winning rate on previous
game, and rules for estimating the best timing for revealing role information.
We were satisfied with the high number of participants in this competition.
However, the large number of disqualified agents shows that there is still a lot
of work necessary in providing good quality English translations of the reference
materials in Japanese, as well as better guidance on the use of the training
server. In fact, all of the 15 finalists were from Japanese institutions, indicating
that much work needs to be done for the internationalization of the Werewolf
competition.
Regarding the strategies of the finalist agents, this year’s protocol had many
new features compared to last year’s competition, in particular the introduction
of logical and causal statements to the communication protocol. However, none
of the winning agents made heavy use of these new features. In fact, it seems that
the current winning strategy is to fine tune the ability of the agent to estimate
the role of the other players based on their output, with very little back and forth
happening between the players. This indicates that the best agents in werewolf
are stuck in “wait and detect” local optima for their strategy. We hope that
participants in future competition will find ways to exploit this fixed strategy.
With this in mind, the ANAC 2020 werewolf challenge will focus on refin-
ing the development environment by providing more documentation, example
code, and tools, so that the participants can spend less time finding bugs in
their agents, and more time developing interesting and diverse strategies for the
Werewolf game.
6 Supply Chain Management
The SCM league models a real-world scenario characterized by profit-maximizing
agents that inhabit a complex, dynamic, negotiation environment [28]. A distin-
guishing feature of the SCM league is the fact that agents’ utility functions
are endogenous. The agents are responsible for devising their utilities for vari-
ous possible agreements, given their unique production capabilities, and then to
negotiate with other agents to contract those that are most favorable to them.
The world modeled by SCML2019 consists of four types of entities: factories,
miners, consumers, and an insurance company. In more detail:
Factories. Entities that convert raw materials and intermediate products into
intermediate and final products by running their manufacturing processes.
Challenges and Main Results of ANAC 2019 377
Different factories are endowed with different capabilities, specified as private
production profiles, known only to the factory’s manager.
Miners. Facilities capable of mining raw materials as needed to satisfy their
negotiated contracts. Miners act only as sellers in the SCM world.
Consumers. Companies interested in consuming a subset of the final prod-
ucts to satisfy some predefined consumption schedule. Consumers act only as
buyers in the SCM world.
Insurance Company. A single insurance company that can insure buyers
against breaches of contract committed by sellers, and vice versa.
Fig. 3. SCML Organization. Factory managers controlled by participants negotiate
with each other and the organization-committee provided miners, consumers and fac-
tory mangers.
In the SCM world, each type of entity is run by a manager agent. The
organizing committee provided manager agents for miners, consumers, and the
insurance company. Figure 3 shows the organization of SCML. The organizing
committee provided a description of the behavior of these agents, including the
miners’ and consumers’ (exact) utility functions, the factory managers’ schedul-
ing algorithm, and an estimation method for the factory managers’ utility func-
tions to all participants [28]. The simulation used NegMAS as the negotiation
platform [27].
The committee also provided a default agent: i.e., a greedy factory manager,
instances of which participated in the competition to ensure sufficiently many
trading opportunities. The goal of each factory manager agent is to accrue as
much wealth (i.e., profit) as possible.
Participants needed to write and submit code (in Java or Python) for an
autonomous agent that acts as a factory manager trying to maximize its total
profit on multiple simulations with varying world configurations.
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The competition was conducted in three tracks: basic, collusion and sabotage.
In the basic and collusion tracks, agents were tasked with maximizing their own
profit. In the sabotage track, they were tasked with minimizing everyone else’s
profits. The difference between the basic and collusion tracks is that in the former
at most one instance of every submitted agent was running in any simulation. In
the collusion tracks, participants were encouraged to find ways for their agents
to collude together to maximize their profit (e.g. by cornering the market). The
sabotage track was introduced to find problems in the league design that could
be exploited to block trade in the market.
After disqualifying agents that did not conform to the rules of the competi-
tion, six agents ran in the basic and collusion tracks and two agents ran in the
sabotage competition.
7 Future Directions
This paper presents the challenges and discusses the results of the competition
leagues. Future directions for research are determined by the participants in
ANAC’s leagues after the lessons learned have been shared. These directions per
league are as follows.
For the Automated Negotiation Main league, the challenge for 2020 is to
design a negotiating agent that can elicit preference information from a user
during the negotiation. The idea is that when a negotiating agent represents a
user in a negotiation, it does not know exactly what the user wants, and therefore
the agent needs to actively improve its user model through a preference elicita-
tion process. To improve the user model, the agent may elicit further information
about the ranking against an elicitation cost.
For Diplomacy, we have concluded that the challenge requires a long-time
effort beyond the possibilities for the current competitors, which may also explain
the low number of competitors. Therefore, we decide to discontinue this league
for the time being.
For the Werewolf league, we will focus in providing a more complete suite of
manuals and sample code to participants, and extend the communication with
organizers during the initial agent testing phase, with the objective of reducing
the number of agents rejected due to bugs and crashes.
For the next Human-Agent competition, we have decided to continue to
expand the problem by allowing human users to specify their own preferences.
We hope this may help increase participant investment in the scenario, as well
as encourage agent designers to respond to a variety of negotiation structures.
For the SCM league, we plan to strengthen the competition while reducing its
complexity. This will be achieved by removing the insurance company, avoiding
any sources of external funds from being inducted into the system, removing
built-in agents from the simulation, having a larger variety of built-in agents and
decomposing the agent into easy to manage components allowing participants
to focus all of their efforts on the main challenge of situated negotiation.
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